• Include MRE within the school
curriculum. Notices posted on
school premises and in public
places could make people more
aware of the program’s availability. Interactive programs,
such as street dramas, quiz contests and essay competitions,
would bring greater attention
to MRE programs.
• Accelerate the campaign for declaring schools “zones of peace.”
• Ensure MRE is incorporated
into military and police training.
• Distribute MRE materials to a
wider population. Additionally, these materials should
be published in the various
languages represented by the
districts and should more accurately depict and represent
the local population.
• Increase government funding
to MRE programs.
• Incorporate information about
common consumer goods used
to make explosive devices into
the MRE programs.
• Promote MRE in children’s
magazines. Additional information could be effective in
reaching small children.
• Promote MRE on radio and
TV stations.
• Arrange for the facilitators to
meet with the cadres of the
emerging armed groups such
as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti
Morcha (Terai People’s Liberation Front)–Goit and Jwala Singh
factions, Madhesi Mukti Tigers,
Madhesi Virus Killer, Terai Jana
Kranti Parishad and others.
• Create and hang wall calendars. Calendars, with their
many pages, dates, events and
holidays, would be effective as
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they can be hung on the walls
of school buildings where students can see the educational
message year round.

The Rapid Response to
Operation Cast Lead

Difficulties

Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal
faces numerous challenges in carrying out its MRE programs. For instance, an incident occurred while
NCBL was on its way to Pakari in the
Saptari district to conduct MRE. The
Tigers questioned NCBL, suspecting
them of propagating fear among the
population. NCBL was able to carry
through with MRE, but an armed
sentry watched over the sessions at
all times. Conflict erupted in the Terai districts, further exacerbating the
situation as armed groups continually kept an eye on MRE program facilitators, inspecting the resource
materials for possible propaganda
against the armed groups.
Strikes, highway blockades and
arson continue to create obstacles
for NCBL facilitators. Furthermore,
limited resources remain a problem.
Conclusion

NCBL constantly faces obstacles to its MRE programs in Nepal.
Mines continue to injure, maim,
and kill men, women and children
in the rural areas. The emergence
of various armed groups in the Terai has further necessitated conducting MRE, and it has become
essential for the government to
sign the AP Mine Ban Convention
and to ensure assistance is provided to mine victims. Furthermore,
engagement in MRE and various
peace-building processes has become imperative in order to restore
lasting peace in Nepal.
See Endnotes, Page 78
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When the United Nations Mine Action Service was asked to assess the need for a
mine-action presence in the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead, a 23-day conflict involving the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militias in 2008, it was thrust
into one of the world’s most complicated humanitarian operating environments. This
article provides a background for the mine-action program in Gaza, summarizing the
key challenges and lessons learned during the first four months of operations in this
complex environment.

by Elena Rice [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

B

etween 27 December 2008, and 18 January 2009, the Israel Defence Forces conducted Operation Cast Lead, a military
campaign with the objective of preventing Palestinian militants from firing homemade rockets
into Israeli territory. The campaign caused severe damage to infrastructure, including roads,
government offices, nongovernmental organizations, U.N. facilities, schools, hospitals and agricultural land. Following the Israeli withdrawal,
the United Nations Mine Action Service—at the
request of the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and in coordination with the U.N. Mine
Action Team—agreed to initiate a Technical
Assessment Mission under the United Nations
Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid
Response. This team arrived in Gaza on 23 January 2009, with these objectives:
• Establish the level of unexplodedordnance contamination
• Determine what assistance UNMAT and
the international mine-action community could provide to the affected civilian population, the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the U.N. Country
Team and other humanitarian actors

Damage to a classroom in a Balgis al Yemen
school, one of the many buildings investigated by
the Technical Assessment team.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MINE ACTION TEAM–GAZA

•

Facilitate the opening of humanitarian
corridors and the delivery of humanitarian aid in line with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 18601
It became clear to the Technical Assessment Mission team that in the days immedi-
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ately following the conflict,
Palestinian forces in Gaza had
conducted surface clearance
of unexploded ordnance,
moving items to central
storage locations where they
could be kept prior to their destruction. They concluded, however, that a number
of international explosiveordnance-disposal teams
would be required to support the safe return of the
humanitarian community to
Gaza. These teams would
be needed to dispose of the
remaining UXO that still
littered schools, U.N. and
NGO offices, hospitals and
homes, as well as UXO that
was expected to be found
buried among the rubble of
destroyed buildings. Under
the coordination of UNMAS,
the UNMAT–Gaza Office
was established to initiate a
rapid response to neutralize
the UXO threat.

37 schools, Gaza’s six main arterial routes, and key U.N. offices and warehouses. Within
six weeks, all U.N. facilities,
contaminated schools and
hospitals in Gaza—and a majority of clinics—had been
surveyed and the UXO was
removed. The core remaining
UXO threat now lies within the ruins of collapsed and
damaged buildings. There is
a high probability that UXO
remains in the rubble of the
15,550 housing units that
were destroyed or damaged
in the conflict.
The United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East and the United Nations
Development Programme,
as well as several nongovernmental organizations, have
initiated projects to remove
more than 150,000 tonnes
(165,000 U.S. tons) of rubble from these buildings, a
necessary precursor to reconstruction of homes and
The Threat
other structures. UNMAT
While anti-tank mines
advised UNRWA and UNDP
were used as a source of exthat if current trends continplosives to support the meue, there is a medium to high
chanical razing of homes,
risk of UXO contamination
UNMAT found little eviin 49 percent of collapsed/
dence to suggest that landdamaged buildings. All ormines were used otherwise.
ganizations involved with
The key threat was from
rubble removal have thereUXO, with urban centers before placed a strong emphaing the most heavily affectA woman walks past ruins of a building UNMAT–GO
sis on explosive-ordnance
ed. As of early June 2009, 28
will investigate for evidence of UXO.
disposal in their operational
percent of items discovered
Operations
planning, the result of a major incontained white phosphorus and 72
In the 10 days immediately fol- formation push on the part of minepercent contained high explosives.
As of 30 June 2009, unconfirmed re- lowing the cessation of hostilities, action staff and the insistence of
ports indicated there had been nine UNMAT and implementing part- several of the donors supporting the
post-war accidents resulting in eight ners conducted UXO-investigation rubble removal that mine action be
tasks that facilitated the opening of written into project documents.
fatalities and 27 injuries.
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The key focus of mine-action operations will be supporting the process of rubble removal and reconstruction by ensuring that the estimated 9,000 Palestinians
involved in this complicated task are able to carry it out
with the minimum possible threat of injury or death
from UXO. This task will be achieved through UNMAT
input into the assessment and planning for such projects, extensive UXO identification and awareness training for those involved, UXO-specific task planning and
site-management training for site supervisors, and the
provision of an “on call” EOD service when items of
UXO are located among the ruins of buildings.

Robert Serry, the U.N. Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process, has identified access as the
key challenge to humanitarian work in Gaza. Given
the obvious Israeli security concerns associated with
permitting mine-action equipment and explosives to
be brought into Gaza, gaining approval to import this

The Challenges

A wide array of political-, security-, access- and
information-related challenges combine to make
Gaza a highly complex operating environment.
Politics. Gaza is, de facto, controlled by Hamas,
with other clan, paramilitary and private-sector actors enjoying significant inf luence. Still, a majority
of the international community views the Palestinian
Authority (predominantly Fatah) as the legitimate
governing body for all of the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, including Gaza. Power struggles between
Hamas and Fatah have led to violent clashes in both
Gaza and the West Bank. Ambiguity surrounding the
question of who runs Gaza has caused complications
for UNMAT and implementing partners, in particular
when trying to distinguish with which local-authority
actors to coordinate. Getting the job done in accordance
with ethical considerations, mindful of the humanitarian principle of “do no harm,” and without aggravating
any of the actors whose support is necessary for sustained operations, has involved a delicate balancing act.
Access. While the intra-Palestinian power struggles
create a challenging environment in which to operate, the
Gaza context is further affected by the influence of Israel,
which controls access for the vast majority of people and
goods into and out of Gaza. Representatives of international aid organizations and the foreign media can enter
subject to coordination with and security clearance from
the Israeli authorities; however, entry and exit must be coordinated in advance, and passage through the highsecurity Erez terminal between Israel and Gaza is often
a lengthy process. In the initial weeks of the mine-action
program, the process of gaining permission for individual
NGO staff to enter Gaza often took several weeks—a long
period of time in the context of a rapid-response scenario.

UXO will likely be found in these Gazan buildings.

equipment in time to be effective has been one of the biggest challenges. All equipment brought into Gaza must be
approved in advance by the Coordinator of Government Affairs in the Territories. Access for specialist EOD and protective equipment has now been approved (three months after
the first request was made), and approval for importation of
explosives and other associated equipment needed for UXO
destruction was granted in principle in late May 2009.
Security. The Israel Defense Forces continue to operate
in and around Gaza, often in response to militant groups
directing homemade rockets toward Israel. Movement of
U.N. staff is severely restricted under U.N. security regulations, and while some parameters may be warranted,
the risk-averse nature of these decisions can severely impact operational-planning implementation and quality assurance. Ongoing Israeli military operations in the
buffer zone inside Gaza adjoining Israel mean that mineaction work in these areas must be coordinated with the
IDF, often implying delays. The Gaza Strip is a small area,
increasing the possibility that teams will find themselves
in the wrong place at the wrong time; thus, ground incursions, targeted airstrikes and ongoing militant operations constitute the key threats to staff safety.
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Information and coordination. Gathering information on the extent and nature of the UXO threat has not
been a straightforward task. On occasion, local authorities
have denied access to sensitive areas for teams conducting risk assessments. Initial post-conflict assessments by
the United Nations and other international bodies did
not look at the possible impact of UXO. An international mine-action sector has not played a role in Gazan humanitarian and recovery efforts previously; thus, those
responsible for planning did not factor in the potential that UXO contamination would impact the people

•

•

ing of who does what, where, and why in a highly
politically-charged and sensitive operating environment (although building relationships with
longer-established U.N. and NGO entities that
could provide advice has proven valuable).
Suitable mapping of Gaza’s general area has not
been available, with implications for coordination with IDF, accurate record-keeping and operational tasking.
The media has not always been a positive force, as
information relevant to or concerning the mineaction program has, on occasion,
been used out of context or twisted
to negative effect.
Overall, UNMAT has learned
to work around, or despite, these
challenges, and to develop solutions or alternatives.
Lessons Learned

A key lesson—reinforced at many
junctures—has been the necessity of keeping staff and equipment
to the minimum quantities necessary. The UNMAT consists of a Programme Manager, Security Officer,
Support Services Officer and Programme Officer, with four national staff. The NGO implementing
partners have operated with between five and seven one-man EOD
teams, a Community-liaison Manager, and a small international and
national support component. DurA 2,000-pound bomb discovered in the second story of a damaged building deming the first months, prior to the
onstrates the challenge EOD teams face.
approval and importation of EOD
or humanitarian operations. Furthermore, as a major- equipment, teams had no option but to work with rudiity of mine-action work will be conducted in support of mentary non-specialist tools, and to carefully prioritize
the work of other agencies, coordination of mine-action only the items truly essential for operations. Planning
activities is strongly linked to other agencies’ funding of program requirements was based on the realization
and planning. As most UXO remains within the rubble that a light footprint was most likely to be successful in
of damaged buildings, UNMAT is now affected opera- an environment in which access is not straightforward.
tionally by other agencies’ planning—or lack thereof—
The Coordinator of Government Affairs in the Teras well as their ability to implement projects in a ritories stated in January that only mine-action organitimely manner.
zations falling under the coordination of the U.N. Mine
Other challenges have included:
Action Team would be permitted to operate in Gaza.
• Establishing relationships as a new actor on the UNMAT has subsequently limited the number of imhumanitarian scene and gaining an understand- plementers to one (with the exception of a three-month
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period between March and May
2009 when two organizations were
working). In the context of Gaza,
where movement, information and
operations must be tightly controlled for security and political reasons, the advantages of operating
with only a few organizations are
numerous.
The Israeli insistence on a close
relationship between the U.N. and
implementing partners meant that
a relatively unconventional structure was established. Instead of a
traditional mine-action coordination center in which the United
Nations oversees the work of implementing actors, a “Mine Action
Team” structure was employed: A
U.N. Programme Manager runs
the overall project, while utilizing the senior technical member
of staff from the implementing
NGO as Operations Manager.
Both components share offices in
Gaza and Jerusalem, and this integrated structure has so far led to
streamlined operations and minimized information gaps, with the
added advantage of reducing overall staffing requirements.
In two related examples of good
practice, the program’s structure,
modus operandi and, to an extent,
its existence, have been continually evaluated during its first four
months. The huge logistical, political and security constraints to
operations have meant that several “crunch dates” were set, on
which the management in Gaza
and UNMAS New York have discussed whether the program should
be closed, downsized or expanded to align with the reality on the
ground. Similarly, the UXO problem in Gaza has (very deliberately)
not been over-sold to donors, the

media or the aid community. From
the beginning, the United Nations
and donors were assured that this
situation was “not another Kosovo 1999 or Lebanon 2006,” with no
evidence of cluster munitions, no
conventional use of landmines and
UXO contamination not as extensive as initially expected. With a distinct mission statement, the project
could realistically be predicted to
have a finite scope, with a maximum
duration of two years from beginning to end. While perhaps somewhat counterintuitive, these factors
have been beneficial for maintaining donor confidence; in particular,
the willingness to take a step back
and honestly examine what the U.N.
Mine Action Team and its partners
can achieve (and whether it is useful) has been well-received by those
funding the program.
Conclusion

Establishing a mine-action program in the context of one of the
world’s longest running conflicts—
where suspicion runs deep in the
psyches of all actors—has been a
highly complicated task, even demoralizing on occasions when it appeared the political impediments
were too great to overcome. Yet patience and persistence, as well as the
occasional “outside the box” solution, have contributed to UNMAT’s
success during its first four months
in Gaza. Mine action is one of the
very few humanitarian sectors with
the ability to operate in Gaza and to
produce success stories in this highly restrictive environment. The U.N.
Mine Action Team and partners will
continue their work in the Gaza Strip
until January 2011, by which time it
is hoped that the area’s deadly legacy
of conflict will have been eliminat-

ed, facilitating a return to a safer and
more stable life for the people who
live and work in the Gaza strip.
See Endnotes, Page 78
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